Sandy Brooke v. Robert S. Clark and Wendy K. Clark : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
Sandy Brooke v. Robert S. Clark and Wendy K.
Clark : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard K. Glauser, Michael W. Wright; Attorneys for Appellees.
C. Ryan Christensen; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Brooke v. Clark, No. 20020794 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3985
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDY BROOKE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
V. 
ROBERT S. CLARK AND WENDY K. 
CLARK, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20020794-CA 
Priority Classification No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Appeal from the Order Granting Defendant Sandy Brooke Motion for Summary 
Judgment cf the THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, Salt lake Department, the Honorable Judge Roger A. Livingston presiding. 
Richard K. Glauser (4324) 
Michael W.Wright (6153) 
7351 South Union Park Avenue, Suite 200 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
(801) 562-5555 
Attorneys for Appellee 
u; 
la 
S«... » 3 
Fauictte Ste^g 
p. -. t 
U W t 
C. Ryan Christensen 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)366-9100 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDY BROOKE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
ROBERT S. CLARK AND WENDY K. 
CLARK, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20020794-CA 
Priority Classification No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Appeal from the Order Granting Defendant Sandy Brooke Motion for Summary 
Judgment of the THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, Salt lake Department, the Honorable Judge Roger A. Livingston presiding. 
. Richard K. Glauser (4324) 
Michael W.Wright (6153) 
7351 South Union Park Avenue, Suite 200 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
(801)562-5555 
Attorneys for Appellee 
C. Ryan Christensen 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)366-9100 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Hi 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings 2 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 3 
D. Statement of Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 7 
POINT I 
AN IDENTITY OF INTEREST CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED BY CLAIMING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WILL NOT SUFFER PREJUDICE 8 
POINT II 
THE PHRASE "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" IS A LEGAL TERM OF 
ART USED TO DESCRIBE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES 
THAT IS CHARACTERIZED BY A COMMON LEGAL INTEREST OR 
POSITION. ROBERT AND WENDY CLARK DID NOT HAVE THE 
SAME POSITION VI A VIS THE LITIGATION 12 
POINT III 
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 15(c) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NO SUPPORT MS. BROOKE'S POSITION 
REGARDING RELATION BACK 20 
POINT IV 
ALLOWING MS. BROOKE'S COMPLAINT TO RELATE BACK 
WOULD UNDERMINE THE DUTY TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE 
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF A CASE BEFORE 
BRINGING SUIT 23 
CONCLUSION 25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 26 
ADDENDA: 
A. Accident Report A 
B. Utah Code Annotated §41-6-31 B 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Breiaaar Props L C v. H.E. Davis & Sons. Inc.. 53 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2002) 9 
Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992) 2 
Condor v. Hunt. 1 P.3d 558 (Utah App. 2000) 13 
Doxev-Lavton Co. v Clark. 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976) 9, 19, 11, 12, 16, 20 
James Constructors. Inc.. v. SLC Corp.. 888 P.2d. 665 (Utah App. 2000) 13 
King v. Unknown Correctional Officer. 201 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2000) 22 
Nunez v.Albo. 2002 Utah App. LEXIS 69 (Utah App. 2002) 14, 16 
Nunnellv v. First Federal Savings and Loan Assoc, of Qqden, 154 P.2d 620 (Utah 
1944) 13 
Nusbaum v. Knobbe. 23 P.3d 302 (Okla. App. 2001) 17, 19 
Otchv v. Citv of Elizabeth. 737 A.2d 1151 (N.J. Super. 1999) 18 
Russell v. The Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995) 15 
Stevenette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.. 977 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1999) 21 
Sulzen v. Williams. 977 P.2d 497 (Utah App. 1999) 17, 18, 19 
Taylor v. Patten. 275 P.2d 696 (Utah 1954) 16 
Vina v. Jefferson Insurance Co., 761 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1988) 16 
Wavne v. Jarvis 197 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1999) 22 
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996) 17, 18, 19 
-iii-
RULES CITED 
Rule 11 U.R.C.P 23 
Rule 15(c) U.R.C.P 5, 6, 7, 10, 22 
Rule 15(c) F.R.C.P 20, 21, 22, 24 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. § 30-2-5 16 
U.C.A. § 30-2-7 16 
U.C.A. § 41-6-31 23 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 1 
OTHER AUTHORITY 
98 California Law Review 1549 24 
-iv-
Jurisdiction of the Court 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case under Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-3. 
Statement of issues 
The appellant, Ms. Sandy Brooke, failed to sue the appellee, Wendy Clark, 
within the four-year statute of limitation. She did file an amended complaint, naming 
Mrs. Clark as an additional defendant, two weeks after the limitations period expired. 
Ms. Brooke claimed that there was an identity of interest between Mrs. Clark and her 
husband, who was named in the original pleadings, because of their family 
relationship. Ms. Brooke also asserted that Mrs. Clark would suffer no prejudice by 
being required to defend against the action. She argued that because of the 
purported identity of interest, and because of the lack of prejudice, the court should 
hold that the amended complaint related back in time to the filing of the original 
complaint. The trial court held that there was no identity of interest between Mrs. 
Clark and her husband, and therefore that the amended complaint naming her as a 
defendant was untimely. The court determined that summary judgment was 
appropriate in those circumstances. Three issues are presented: 
(1) Did the trial court err deciding that there was no identity of interest 
between Wendy Clark and her husband, Robert Clark? 
(2) Did the trial court err in determining that the amended complaint did not 
relate back in time to the filing of the initial complaint? 
(3) Did the court err in granting summary judgment to Wendy Clark? 
1 
These are questions of law, and are reviewed de novo. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 
P.2d97(Utah 1992). 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case: The Appellant, Sandy Brooke, brought this case to 
recover damages she alleges she suffered in an automobile accident with Mrs. 
Wendy Clark, the appellee. (R. 5-7) The original complaint named Mr. Robert Clark 
as the sole defendant, and was filed five days before the statute of limitations 
expired. (R. 1-3). On February 5,2001, thirteen days after the statute of limitations 
had run, Ms. Brooke amended her complaint to add Mrs. Clark as a defendant. (R. 
5-7). 
B. Course of Proceedings. On April 19, 2001, Mr. and Mrs. Clark filed 
separate motions for summary judgment. (R. 60-65) Mr. Clark alleged that there 
was no basis for holding him liable for any damages suffered by Ms. Brooke, 
because he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the collision. (R. 20-39). Mrs. 
Clark, who was involved in the accident, asserted that summary judgment should be 
granted in her favor, because the action against her was not initiated within the time 
prescribed by law. (R. 40-59) 
Ms. Brooke did not file and serve a memorandum in opposition to either of the 
motions within the period prescribed by law, and on May 7, 2001 both Mr. and Mrs. 
Clark filed notices to submit their motions for the decision of the trial court. (R. 69-
73) Only after receiving those notices, did Ms. Brooke decide to respond. At that 
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time she filed a motion and memorandum requesting that the court consider her 
arguments in opposition to the pending motions. (R. 75-80). She also asked the 
court to hold a hearing on her requests. (R. 81). In support of her motion, Ms. 
Brooke included an affidavit prepared and signed by K. David Olsen, a paralegal in 
the office of her legal counsel, which stated that her failure to respond to the motion 
in a timely manner was the result of an unspecified "glitch." (R. 82) 
C. Disposition in Trial Court Below: Despite the untimeliness of Ms. 
Clarks' opposition, the trial court granted a hearing on the Clarks' motions, which 
was held on June 13, 2001. (R. 84) After considering oral argument, the trial court 
granted both motions. (R. 113-114) Ms. Brooke then requested that the court 
permit her time to do discovery on the question of whether Mrs. Clark had actual 
knowledge about the pendency of Ms. Brooke's claim before being formally named 
in the complaint. After hearing argument the court granted the motion, and gave Ms. 
Brooke sixty (60) days to conduct depositions. (R. 142) After that period expired, 
Ms. Brooke requested additional time (R. 143-157), and, once again, the court 
granted the motion. (R. 186). Counsel for Ms. Brooke deposed both Mr. and Mrs. 
Clark (R. 191-192), and on June 20, 2002, a year after the court first granted the 
motions, the court then formally signed the order in favor of Mrs. Clark. (R. 188-
190)1 This appeal followed. 
1
 The trial court signed the order in favor of Mr. Clark in November of 2001. (R. 
116-117). The order in favor of Mr. Clark is not subject to appeal. 
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D. Statement of Facts: This action arose out of an automobile accident that 
occurred on January 23, 1997 on Lone Hollow Road in Sandy, Utah. (R. 1-3, 30-
31). At the time of the collision, Mrs. Clark was driving an auto owned by her 
husband, Robert Clark, while Ms. Brooke was operating an auto owned by Ms. Linda 
Garcia. (R. 30-31). 
In December of 2000, Ms. Brooke retained the firm of Eisenberg and Gilchrist 
to represent her in a suit against the defendant. (R. 111). Approximately a month 
later, on January 19,2001, her attorneys filed a complaint, which named Mr. Robert 
Clark as the sole defendant in this case, and which alleged that he negligently 
operated the other vehicle in the accident. (R. 1-3) After being served with a copy 
of the complaint, which also wrongly identified the location of the accident2, Mr. Clark 
telephoned Ms. Brooke's counsel to inquire about the matter. (R. 93) He was not 
able to speak to an attorney during this initial call, but was eventually contacted by 
Mr. Olsen, a paralegal with the firm. (R. 94) During the conversation, which took 
place on January 25, 2001, Mr. Olsen confirmed that Mr. Clark was the husband of 
Wendy Clark, and then informed him that his firm had sued the proper party. (R.94) 
Mr. Olsen sent a letter to Mr. Clark, which confirmed the content of their 
conversation. (R. 96). Mr. Olsen filed an affidavit with the trial court admitting that 
he did not seek to obtain a copy of the police report until the middle of January 2001, 
2
 The complaint stated that the accident occurred on Lone Peak Boulevard, in 
Sandy. (R. 2). The accident actually occurred on Lone Hollow Road, in Sandy. (R. 30-
31) 
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shortly before the limitations period was due to expire. (R. 111) 
On February 5,2001, Ms. Brooke filed an amended complaint, which named 
both Mr. Robert Clark and Mrs. Wendy Clark as defendants. (R. 5-7) Mr. and Mrs. 
Clark answered the complaint, and then two months later, each filed a motion for 
summary judgment. As set out above, even though there was no timely response 
to the motions, the court granted hearing on the matter, and after consideration of 
the arguments presented, it ruled in favor of the defendants. (R. 113-114) In 
granting Mrs. Clark's motion, the court found that the undisputed facts showed that 
Mrs. Clark was first brought into the action after the applicable statute of limitations 
had expired, and ruled that the amendment did not relate back to the time of the 
filing of the initial complaint, because there was no identity or interest between her 
and her husband. (R. 188-190). The Court also found that the undisputed facts 
showed that Mrs. Clark did not know of the pendency of the lawsuit until February 
of 2001, when she was served with the complaint. (R. 189). The order was entered 
on June 20, 2002. (R. 188-190). 
Summary of Arguments 
1. The trial court properly dismissed the cause of action against Wendy Clark, 
because the amended complaint, which added her as a defendant, was filed after 
the statute of limitations had expired. The amended complaint did not relate back 
under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because there is no identity 
of interest between Wendy Clark and her husband, Robert Clark. 
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2. Mere lack of prejudice or possibility of notice is not sufficient to establish 
an identity of interest, which is a prerequisite for relation back. Statutes of limitations 
serve an important purpose, and should not be disturbed unless there is good cause 
to do so. Additionally, Ms. Brooke's failure to designate the proper party and the 
accurate location of the accident, undermines her claim that adequate notice was 
given. 
3. An identity of interest can only exist where the parties have an identity of 
legal interest, sufficient to give them the same posture in the litigation. A marital 
relationship is not sufficient to create an identity of interest in this case, because Mr. 
and Mrs. Clark had different interests and postures toward Ms. Brooke's claims. 
4. This court should rely on Utah case law when interpreting Utah Rules of 
Procedure. The federal rule, and case law, is substantially different from our rule. 
Additionally, even under the federal rule, Ms. Brooke's claim would not survive 
because she did not make a mistake, as defined in case law, and Mr. Clark 
remained a target of the pending litigation, even after Ms. Brooke attempted to bring 
Mrs. Clark into the action. 
5. Public policy favors a more principled interpretation of Rule 15(c). The 
plaintiff should be required to obtain public information that would allow her to name 
the proper party. Her failure to act until just before the limitations period ended is 
negligent. Rule 15(c) was not designed to help those who fail to take reasonable 
steps to preserve their claim. 
6 
Argument 
Introduction 
The issues and facts presented for the Court's consideration are relatively 
simple and straightforward. Ms. Brooke did not file her complaint against Wendy 
Clark within the period prescribed by law. Ms. Clark moved for summary judgment 
on that basis, and Ms. Brooke opposed, maintaining that her amended complaint 
should be viewed as timely, because Wendy Clark and her husband, Robert Clark, 
who was named as a defendant in the original complaint, share an identity of 
interest. 
The identity of interest argument made by Ms. Clark is predicated on two basic 
allegations: 
(1) That Mrs. Clark had notice of the action at an early date, and therefore she 
would suffer no prejudice by being required to defend against the claim; and, 
(2) The marital relationship is, in itself, sufficient to establish that there is an 
identity of interest between Mrs. Clark and her husband, and therefore the amended 
complaint should relate back in time. 
The general question presented for review requires the Court to determine the 
proper scope of the "relation back" doctrine set out in Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and, in particular, to answer whether the rule should be extended 
so as to justify adding a defendant to pending litigation, even after the statute of 
limitation has run, merely because the party has a marital relationship with a person 
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named in the original complaint. Mrs. Clark is confident that once the court 
considers the circumstances of this case, and carefully applies the controlling 
principles of law, it will come to the same conclusions reached by the trial court. 
Namely, Wendy Clark did not share an identity of interest with her husband; the 
amended complaint naming her as a defendant, which was filed after the statutory 
period, did not relate back in time to the filing of the original complaint; and the 
decision to grant summary judgment was appropriate. 
Point I 
AN IDENTITY OF INTEREST CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED BY 
CLAIMING THAT THE DEFENDANT WILL NOT SUFFER 
PREJUDICE 
In her opening brief Ms. Brooke contends that the trial court should have ruled 
that the amended complaint related back in time, because Mrs. Clark had notice of 
the action early on in the process.3 In essence, this argument attempts to contrast 
what Ms. Brooke sees as the relative lack of prejudice that will be suffered by Mrs. 
Clark with the relatively greater harm that she will suffer from not being able to 
pursue her claim. And, she concludes, dismissal of her action via this "mechanical 
application" of the statute of limitations is inconsistent with both the interests of 
3
 In support of this claim, Ms. Brooke asserts that a complaint adequately 
describing the accident was served on Mr. Clark just after the limitations period expired. 
Of course she does not mention that the complaint not only misidentified the party who 
was involved in the accident, it misidentified the place of the accident. Thus, despite 
claims to the contrary, it is quiet easy to see that Mrs. Clark would not have known that 
the action was directed toward her. 
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justice and the liberal policies set out in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On the surface, this appeal to "fairness" may have a certain charm. When 
analyzed more carefully, however, it is obvious that Ms. Brooke's understanding of 
the relation back doctrine creates direct conflict with other, equally important, 
policies and rules which have been established to properly handle legal disputes. In 
particular, it conflicts with our legislature's decision to promote the prompt 
investigation and adjudication of disputes - while penalizing those who are dilatory -
by establishing statutes of limitation. See, Breiaaar Props. . L.C. v. H.E. Davis & 
Sons. Inc.. 53 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2002). 
At the outset, it is important to recognize that, by their very nature, statutes 
of limitation operate without regard to individual questions of prejudice. After all, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to explain how a complaint filed one day after the 
running of the period causes prejudice to a defendant, while a complaint filed a day 
before the statute expires is deemed acceptable. Nevertheless, the legislature has 
determined that the former is subject to dismissal, while the latter may go forward. 
Simply put, any test that focuses on actual prejudice would end up swallowing the 
rule and would emasculate limitations and the certainty they support. In fact, when 
first enunciating the identity of interest test, the Utah Supreme Court cautioned 
against this potential result. Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark, eta!.. 548 P.2d 902, 906 
(Utah 1976) 
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The conclusion that "lack of prejudice" need not give rise to "identity" also 
flows naturally from a deliberate reading of the cases and statutes that govern 
situations such as this. Accordingly, a brief review of the relevant authority is the 
proper place to begin the consideration of the issues presented here. As is made 
clear from its text, Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (the source of the 
relation back doctrine) is designed to allow a party to assert additional causes of 
action against a named defendant, even though the time for making the new claims 
may have passed.4 Doxey, id., made clear, however, that the rule does not operate 
in the same manner when it comes to adding new parties to pending litigation. In 
that case the Utah Supreme Court held that the relation back provisions of Rule 
15(c) do not generally apply to amendments that substitute or add new plaintiffs or 
new defendants. As set out above, in making this decision, the Court expressed a 
specific concern that if the rule was used to justify the easy addition of new parties, 
the very purpose of statutes of limitation would be defeated. 
The Supreme Court did carve out a narrow exception to this general rule, 
when it stated that if the party to be added had an identity of interest with a party 
already before the court, the amendment would be considered timely. Id.-, at 906. 
In so holding, the court reasoned that this exception was not harmful because if 
there was a true identity, the new party would not suffer any prejudice. 
4
 The new causes of action must also arise out of the same course of 
conduct detailed in the first pleadings. 
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The Doxev exception has become the source of considerable controversy. 
Parties, like this appellant, have attempted to latch onto the court's language 
regarding lack of prejudice, and the desire to avoid a mechanical use of a statute of 
limitations, as a means of justifying the untimely joinder of new defendants in any 
number of circumstances. This formulation of Doxev's holding, however, turns the 
case on its head. A careful reading of the opinion shows that an "identity of interest" 
is the necessary predicate for an amended complaint to relate back, and that the 
reference to a "lack of prejudice" is made only to show that the exception will not 
lead to injustice. Ms. Brooke's construction of Doxev. which focuses on the presence 
or absence of prejudice suffers from the basic logical error of false equivalency. That 
is, while the existence of a predicate may create a set of extrinsic conditions, the 
presence of those extrinsic conditions does not necessarily mean that the predicate 
is present. Or, in terms directly applicable to the issues under consideration here, 
an "identity of interest" may ensure a lack of prejudice, but the absence of prejudice 
does not create an identity of interest. 
If a lack of prejudice is not equivalent to an "identity of interest", then, how 
should the test be defined? This will be detailed below. 
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Point II 
THE PHRASE "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" IS A LEGAL TERM OF 
ART USED TO DESCRIBE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES 
THAT IS CHARACTERIZED BY A COMMON LEGAL INTEREST OR 
POSITION. ROBERT AND WENDY CLARK DID NOT HAVE THE 
SAME POSITION VIS A VI THE LITIGATION 
As set out above, the appellant appears to view the Doxey test as an empty 
vessel, which may be filled by any relationship between new defendants and old, so 
long as the relationship involves the possibility or probability of communication. In 
appellant's view an identity of interest between Mr. and Mrs. Clark can be 
established by showing that it was likely that the old party would have told the party 
to be added that a lawsuit was pending. (This focus on constructive notice is merely 
a more particular variation on the lack of prejudice argument addressed earlier.) 
Such a standard, unfortunately, suffers from a number of basic flaws. It ignores the 
plain language chosen by the Utah Supreme Court to describe the circumstances 
that allow relation back. It also fails to take into account how the test has been 
applied in the past quarter of a century. And, finally, the appellant's version of the 
identity of interest test is so expansive that it allows the exception to swallow the 
rule. 
a. Identity of Interest Is a defined term, with a precise meaning which 
does not apply here: The most obvious problem with Ms. Brooke's understanding 
of the expression "identity of interest", is that it fails to recognize that the language 
used by the Utah Supreme Court in Doxev has a precise meaning. The phrase 
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"identity of interest" is, after all, one that is commonly used in a number of legal 
contexts, ranging from the certification of class action lawsuits to the implementation 
of the doctrine of res judicata. See, for example, Condor v. Hunt. 1 P.3d 558 (Utah 
App. 2000), re: claim preclusion; Nunnellv v. First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Ogden. 154 P.2d 620 (Utah 1944) re: class action lawsuits; and 
James Constructors. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 888 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994) re: 
surety and indemnity law. What is significant about these cases is that in every 
instance the phrase "identity of interest" is employed in the same way, i.e., to 
describe a relationship that is based on a common legal position or common interest 
in a case. This usage conforms with, and is most likely derived from, the dictionary 
meaning of "identity", which inevitably involves the concept of "sameness", See, 
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. 2001, p. 950.Thus, under the plain language of 
the exception, in order for parties to share an "identity of interest" they must share 
the "same" interest. 
Ms. Brooke's proffered interpretation of the identity test utterly disregards the 
meaning of the Court's language. But unless we are willing to believe that the Utah 
Supreme Court chose its words carelessly, and in doing so jettisoned a well-
established meaning for a commonly used phrase, the "identity of interest" test, as 
set out in Doxev. must be interpreted as requiring an identity of legal interest or a 
common legal position vis a vi the case at issue. 
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b. The principled interpretation is supported by case law and does not 
fit the facts of this case: The more principled view of the test, which was adopted 
by the trial court and is advocated here by Mrs. Clark also finds strong support in the 
cases that have applied the standard to a variety of fact patterns over the years. In 
Doxev. itself, the Court was faced with a dispute over a real estate contract, and 
determined that an amended pleading that added the heirs of the parties named in 
the original complaint could relate back, because there was an identity of interest 
between the heirs and the decedents, who had signed the contract. This, of course, 
is a classic example of a common position or interest in a case. The rights and 
responsibilities of the heirs were in fact derived from - and in no way differed from -
the rights of their ancestors. 
Similarly, in the recent case of Nunez v. Albo. et.al.. 2002 Utah App. LEXIS 
69 (Utah App. 2002), this court was presented with a case in which the plaintiff had 
first sued a physician, and then sought to add his governmental employers, the 
University of Utah and its medical school, as new defendants. This court found that 
an identity of interest, and held that the amended complaint would therefore relate 
back in time. As with the link between a decedent and his heirs, an admitted 
employer-employee relationship presents a classic example of a common position 
or interest in the litigation, because every aspect of the employer's liability is based 
on what the employee has or has not done. 
14 
In contrast to these cases are those which find that other relationships, no 
matter how close, do not satisfy the "identity" test. The most instructive of these is 
Russell v. The Standard Corporation. 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). There, the Plaintiff 
alleged a claim for libel against the Associated Press and the Salt Lake Tribune in 
her first complaint. After finding out that the article had originated with the Standard 
Examiner in Ogden, Ms. Russell sought to add that paper as an additional 
defendant. Although the statute of limitations had expired, Ms. Russell claimed that 
an identity of interest existed among the various defendants, because the parties 
had an active and ongoing contractual relationship. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected this contention out of hand. Significantly, the Court made no inquiry into 
whether the Tribune or the Associated Press gave actual notice of the claim to the 
Standard Examiner, although it is clear that parties involved in an active business 
relationship have both opportunity and reason to communicate about a variety of 
issues, presumably including Ms. Russell's lawsuit. Instead, the court simply 
pointed out that not all relationships involved an identity of interest. 
For this reason, Ms. Brooke's argument that the trial court should have found 
an identity of interest because it seems likely a husband would tell his wife about 
being sued is without support. Mere opportunity for, or even actual, communication 
is not enough. The parties must also share the type of common legal bond or 
15 
position described in Doxev. supra, and Nunez, supra.5 
That is not true here. Robert Clark and Wendy Clark are two separate people, 
and their distinct legal existence is a matter of well-established law. Almost a half 
century ago, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the legislature had clearly intended 
to "establish the separate identity of the husband and wife . . . as if they were not 
married." Tavlor v. Patten. 275 P.2d 696 (Utah 1954). This same statutory scheme is in 
effect today, as evidenced by legislative enactments providing that neither spouse is liable 
for the separate debts and obligations of the other, and the more specific measure stating 
that a husband is not liable for the torts of his wife. Utah Code Ann., §30-2-5 and §30-2-
7. Clearly the import of both the Tavlor decision and the statutory language, cited above, 
is to distinguish between the rights and interests of individual spouses, and to clarify that 
the legal unity of spouses - the legal fiction of singular existence - has no place in our 
jurisdiction. See, Tavlor. supra, 670. In light of these pronouncements, and in light of 
the fact that neither the original, nor the amended, complaint based Robert's liability 
on Wendy's actions, it is absurd to suggest that Mr. and Mrs. Clark have legally 
identical or common interests. In point of fact, quite the opposite is true. Robert's 
defense to the original complaint was to point the finger at his wife, while his defense 
to the amended complaint was to express indifference. In neither case was he to be 
5
 This position also finds support in Vina v. Jefferson Insurance Co... 761 
P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1988). There the court held that an amended complaint that 
attempted to add a third party claim against a defendant already involved in the 
litigation did not relate back. It held that the individual's legal position as a 
defendant was different from his position as a third party defendant. The 
amendment was deemed untimely. 
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bound by the actions of Wendy. The facts here do not resemble those of Doxev or 
Nunez, and the court should not find an identity of interest. 6 
c. The misnomer cases should not be applied to facts like those that are 
presented here: In arguing that the probability that notice would be given is 
sufficient to establish a legal identity, Ms. Brooke cites to Sulzen v. Williams. 977 
P.2d 497 (Utah App. 1999) and Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d. 367 (Utah 
1996). While it is true that these cases appear to adopt a less stringent standard 
than that advocated above, a careful review of the operative facts of those cases 
shows that they are completely inapposite to the issues presented here. 
Both Sulzen and Wilcox share a common fact pattern and fit within what are 
commonly known as misnomer cases. In both cases the proper defendant was 
identified in the body of the complaint, but was misnamed in the caption. And in both 
cases the intended party was actually served with a copy of the summons and 
complaint. Finally, in both cases the amendments that were sought by the plaintiffs, 
were sought in order to correct a technical defect in the pleadings. Thus, Ms. 
Brooke's belief that it was the family relationship that persuaded the court to find an 
identity of interest is mistaken. The court found that the amendment should relate 
6
 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals recently reached the same conclusion in 
Nusbaum v. Knobbe. 23 P.3d 302 (Ok.App. 2001). The court was presented with 
a claim that a family relationship, the use of a common attorney and a common 
insurer created an identity of interest. The court rejected the argument, 
reasoning that familial relationships did not necessarily give rise to common legal 
interests. 
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back because the children had been properly identified in the body of the complaint, 
and changing the phraseology in the caption was permissible under Rule 15(c). 
Sulzen. at 501. 
These misnomer cases are analytically different from cases in which a new 
party is going to be added. For example, in misnomer cases there is no need to 
inquire into whether the parties share a common interest, because there are not 
multiple parties to consider. Similarly, in both Sulzen and Wilcox the fact that the 
parties were actually served with process obviated any need to inquire into whether 
notice was actually given. Each party had actually received notice. 
The significant differences between misnomer cases and other identity of 
interest cases have been noted by courts in other jurisdictions. For example, in 
Otchv v. City of Elizabeth Board of Education. 1Z1 A.2d 1151 (N.J.Super. 1999), the 
Superior Court of New Jersey characterized the difference between misnomer cases 
and those in which a new party was to be added, as a difference between a formal 
and a substantive change, and noted that formal changes presented less cause for 
concern. 
Here, the addition of Wendy Clark was not a formal or stylistic change. It was 
not a mere correction of spelling or capacity, nor was it a mere substitution of a 
misnamed party. (After all, Ms. Brooke continued to assert a cause of action against 
Robert Clark in her amended complaint.) The amended complaint named a 
separate individual, who had rights and obligations separate and distinct from the 
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party previously named. f he i nore relaxed standard, which was nnu'iKii1tMl in 
Sulzen and Wilcox, was predicated on the fact that the actual parties were the same 
in hi Hi .Hdiniis III i „ ,]inlr Minph , h i-t applieubL to the facts presented here. 
d. The position advocated by the plaintiff has n n nrinciplpri boundaries. 
Briefly, it should also be noted that the probable notice theory advanced by Ms. 
Brooke contaii is i i :> pi in icipled i i leai is c f distir iguishing between relationships that 
would support; an identity of interest and those which would not, If notice is f!n:i I- - ,\i 
..- - ••> ..J^G a .se under a myriad of facts. For example, wnat would hapoer • a 
party,. •* - I'-mimr -.<lit agamd the auto's owner: »D uutr nroximit 
t esidencetheivpo .,. . o^ - ^
 0^in that would support an assumption that notice was 
given? What - *-- - _ _ 
assumption? v;hat abou' :r-e case of a child who has become estranged from his 
parents? LL>~'....w . - • itself, support an assumption of notice? The 
These hypothetical situations are offered to show that no "type" of relatioi isl lip 
can HI isHIM flit ii in In i ,i MIII "on n in in J be provided to anothei potential defendant. 
In crier in as-1 -•* fairness a trial court vvouid be r-~":r~*g •-- ; -.-.. 
preti.o. ^.-v , jetermine if act;-' '-—ice ,vas giv^n. - alternative it cc. :1 
simolv assume that . , .. .;;,.,.-_ L 
seems clear that a party wrongfully accused or only partially liable might well contact 
19 
other potential defendants to help share the blame or costs.) This, however, raises 
the very problems noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Doxev. A test that provides 
no reasonable boundaries threatens to undermine the statute of limitation. A better 
option is to adopt the test accepted by the trial court and advocated here. It is firmly 
based on the plain language the Court selected in announcing the exception, and 
it conforms with standard modes of interpretation. 
Point HI 
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 15(c) OF THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NOT SUPPORT MS. BROOKE'S 
POSITION REGARDING RELATION BACK. 
Ms. Brooke also attempts to utilize the provisions of Rule 15(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to support her claim that the amended complaint against 
Mrs. Clark should relate back. Once again, however, a careful analysis of the 
arguments presented shows that Ms. Brooke's position is flawed for at least three 
reasons. First, it fails to recognize that the language of the two rules is, in fact, very 
different. Second, it fails to recognize that the events described in its complaint do 
not fit within the majority position concerning "mistake" of party. Finally, Ms. Brooke 
does not recognize that the addition of Mrs. Clark did not constitute a substitution of 
parties, as seems to be required by the Federal Rule. 
a. The Federal Rule is Fundamentally Different from the Rule Adopted 
by Our Supreme Court. It should not guide this Court's Decision: In the 
second section of her opening brief, Ms. Brooke argues that this court should take 
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i lance from decisions issued by federal courts that interpret- — •-
• oi c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and asser «r it-toes so thf-'" jr . 
amended complaint. While the ar^ellee concedes that federal decisions may be 
used as persuasive authority u - -r.p situations involving questions relating to 
In the recent case of Stey- " Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. 977 P.2d 508 n ,+?h 
App. I .\. i ••-. ^ u i . pointed out that wnen there is no relevant state authority - at 
interprets sv • 
federal rules may be used to aive aoorapriate guidance. ; .o.o, i i j .^vw,, 
these ( . . „
 r v,_ . . ^ '~<* are numerous cases decided by our own 
appellate courts tnat give dire^'-
Many of them have been identified in the body of thu brief, and when these cases 
ai, {> • ,ir)i isofonlit HI i J y i eat! - m H I applied LI ley suffice to answer the questions presented 
on appeal. Thus, there is no need to look to ou+~ide authority Se«~ r-
Rule is substantially different from that given by our i; -* Court While Utah has 
retained the identity of IIHi-Mesi test, \\w fedei . _-„ ^ . j . t ; , . - ^ 
three-prong test relating to notice, mistake, and transaction. I I IUS, while tl lere may 
be some similarities betweei i tl le two rules, there are more essential differences. 
These differences make the federal case la^  A t
 : 
questions raised here. 
21 
b. Ms. Brooke did not make a "mistake", as required by the Federal 
Rule: Even if the court were inclined to look to the federal rule, Ms. Brooke would 
likely be very disappointed in the results. As set out in her brief, Rule 15(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the party seeking the relation back of 
an amendment show that it made a mistake in its initial pleading. But, the majority 
of federal courts that have interpreted that language have held that "lack of 
knowledge" about the identity of the proper defendant is not a mistake. See, for 
example, the recent case of King v. Unknown Correctional Officer. 201 F.3d 910, 
914 (7th Cir. 2000), and Wavne v. Jarvis 197 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1999). 
Here, Ms. Brooke has conceded that the reason she did not name Mrs. Clark 
in the first instance is because she did not know who she was, as she did not have 
an accident report when the case was filed. Under the reasoning set forth in King. 
supra, and Wayne, supra, this failure arose out of a lack of knowledge, not a 
mistake, and therefore may not be corrected through recourse to Rule 15(c). 
c. The amendment did not cure a mistaken designation: It is also 
instructive to note that the federal counterpart to Utah's Rule 15(c) requires that the 
party being added understand that it was the intended target of the lawsuit, and that 
but for the mistake in pleading it would have appeared in the first suit. Once again, 
if this court were inclined to take guidance from the federal courts it would have to 
conclude that relation back is not proper under the facts of this case. It should be 
noted that the amended complaint did not substitute Mrs. Clark's name for that of her 
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husband ; Jaed, M- _:ooke did not dismiss Mr. Clark from the action until a 
motion ror s i rT ia i j judgment was brought and argued Thus, it is difficult to see 
'.T 
intended target of the suit, when the amended pleading continued to target him. The 
facts of this case do not show that a mistake occurred, they show that a choice was 
mad^ In '"i irl i r^po, tho ,ii')rti1inn (if H |ni1y ^ln n ilil i u il ht" pt' imilted 
Point IV 
ALLOWING MS. BROOKE'S COMPLAINT TO RELATE BACK 
WOULD UNDERMINE THE DUTY TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE 
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF A CASE BEFORE 
BRINGING SUIT. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a oariv and counsel 
themselves of both the factual and legal basis for making their claims before filing 
a complaint. Here, this means that Ms. Brooke and ner attorney were required to 
lakesurh steps asweic-i rcjsuiidbK nrcessaiy luascei lain who was driving the auto 
that collided with her back in 1997. Fortunately, such information - i —p^- -s 
public record, and is easily obtained by requesting an acciderV ••. • >rt rror-. :• e 
investigating aqencv Yot, in liijrii|',-,iiiini hriof f1s Rn.>r»ki''"» mm 
did not take that simple step until just days before the statute of limitations was due 
7
 This information by law would also have been exchanged at the accident 
scene pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-31. 
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to expire, even though he received the file from his client almost a month earlier. 
In a recent law review article published by the University of California, the 
author noted that relation back doctrine was developed primarily to address 
situations in which plaintiffs initially have a great deal of difficulty in ascertaining the 
names or the identity of the correct defendants. Such situations arise, for example, 
when a party cannot determine which agency of the government to sue, or when an 
unidentified defendant can only be identified by means of discovery. 89 Calif.LRev. 
1549,1550. This is not the situation presented here. Rule 15 was not designed to 
protect a client or counsel for failing to obtain information that was neither hidden nor 
hard to discover, and its protections should not be extended in cases such as this. 
In short, allowing the complaint to relate back in this case would invert all of 
the general requirements that attend the filing of a lawsuit. Ms. Brooke's failure to 
take the steps necessary to preserve her cause of action - even though she had 
four years to ascertain the proper parties - would be excused. On the other hand 
that failure would be used to justify depriving the defendant of the assurances that 
statutes of limitation bring. The Court should not sanction such a result, especially 
in cases such as this where the failure to name the proper party was the sole result 
of Ms. Brooke's own negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court made the correct decision when it ruled that Mrs. Clark and her 
husband did not share an identity of interest sufficient to allow the amended 
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complaint to i elate back Under well established principles of law, an identity of 
imfaip f^ Qhoniii nnfy hp t i i | wi\u i > tiiiM [jdilic Ii i L' identical iegai interests or an 
id. denrical position in ;he pend , n n hiir,TuOh. » ICIC, ivn. d , ~ ~' r\ /i - ~ ^
s
 i ~ 
ciTicreiit orientations toward trie nnaatior. O j r l should reject an, _;. -re 
_ .IJ'L.CW L-biween parties. . - \ j h > j t ^ i 
The court should also recognize that our legislature has established statutes 
<-•• •..•sr-duons .. oroer t~ ""~" ' fcr the prompt and proper adjudication of disputes. 
"--•-- • - ->: -IMS - )\-)i\ ohuuliJ mil lit.* bdot doid-j liijhll/, arid must 
certainly shou'd not be ignored because Ms. Brooke and her counsel failed to obtain 
. • .u..c ;.-.-.: .s a matto. or public information. This Court should uphold the 
summary iudaner^ pni^'-.-i h^k-
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ADDENDUM B 
41-6-31 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-31. Accident involving injury, death, or p roper ty 
damage — Duties of operator, occupant, owner. 
Q) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or 
death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property, if the vehicle 
or other property is operated, occupied, or attended by any person or if the 
owner of the vehicle or property is present, shall: 
(a) give to the persons involved his name, address, and the registration 
number of the vehicle he is operating; 
(b) upon request and if available, exhibit his operator's license to: 
(i) any investigating peace officer present; 
(ii) the person struck; 
(iii) the operator, occupant of, or person attending the vehicle or 
other property damaged in the accident; and 
(iv) the owner of property damaged in the accident, if present; and 
(c) render to any person injured in the collision reasonable assistance, 
including the transporting, or the making of arrangements for the trans-
porting, of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or 
surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if the 
transporting is requested by the injured person. 
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or 
death of any person or property damage to an apparent extent of $1,000 or 
more shall immediately and by the quickest means of communication available 
gi\' notice of the accident to the nearest office of a law enforcement agency. 
(3) If the operator of a vehicle is physically incapable of giving an immediate 
notice of an accident as required in Subsections (1) and (2) and there is another 
occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of giving an 
immediate notice, the occupant shall give or cause to be given the notice 
required of the operator under this section. 
(4) If the operator is physically incapable of making a written report of an 
accident when required under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of the 
vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident shall within 15 
days after becoming aware of the accident make the report required of the 
operator under this section. 
His to ry : L. 1941, ch . 52, § 21 ; C, I M S , A m e n d m e n t No tes . — The 1996 amend-
57-7-98; L. 1983, ch , 183, fc 32; 1987, ch. 138, ment, effective April 29, 1996, substi tuted 
§ 25; 1992, eh . 28, § 1; 1996, ch. 174, k 1. "$1,000" for W$75(T m Subsection (2) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles certificate, 6 A.L.R.Sd 506 
and Highway Traffic § 349 et seq. Sufficiency of showing of driver's involve-
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of statute
 m e n t in motor vehicle accident to support pros-
making it a criminal offense for the operator of ecution for failure to stop, furnish ldentifica-
a motor vehicle not to carry or display his tion, or render aid, 82 A.L.R.4th 232. 
operator's license or the vehicle registration 
41-6»32- Collision with una t tended vehicle or other p rop-
er ty — Duties of operator. 
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident 
with any vehicle or other property which is unattended and which results in 
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